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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20080965
vs.
GREGORY WILLIAM WEINER,

District Ct. No. 021902227

Defendant/Appellee.

Appeal from final order of dismissal, in the Third District Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake
County, Honorable Deno Himonas.
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ARGUMENT
L UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF APPLICABLE STATUTES, THE
APPELLANT PROPERLY FILED THIS MATTER IN THE DISTRICT
COURT, THE ONLY JUDICAL FORUM HAVING COMPETENT
JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE THIS CASE AT ITS INCEPTION,
NEITHER THE COURT BELOW NOR THE APPELLEE HERE HAS
OFFERED A SUFFICIENT LEGAL BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT THE
DISTRICT COURT'S JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE THIS MATTER
WAS TERMINATED BY THE SUBSEQUENT CREATION OF THE JUSTICE
COURT.
The Appellee's opening brief addresses four separate lines of argument: 1) that the
Legislature has the power to control the jurisdiction of the Courts; 2) that the Sixth
Amendment has no bearing on the dismissal of this matter; 3) that the trial Court's
retroactivity analysis is not necessary to this Court's decision; and 4) that the Appellant's
argument that it has continued to prosecute other similar cases in District Court has no
bearing on the outcome of this case. As to arguments 2) and 3), relating to the issues of
the Sixth Amendment and retroactivity, respectively, the City submits to the Court the
arguments made in its opening brief. The City addresses the remaining issues raised by
the appellee below.
At the outset, the City reiterates its earlier agreement with the proposition that the
Legislature determines the subject matter jurisdiction of Utah's Courts. See Appellant's
opening brief at 7. The power and prerogatives of the Legislature to establish and control
the jurisdiction of the Courts is not at issue in this case. Additionally, both parties agree
that the Legislature has expressed its plain intent concerning the subject matter of District
Courts over class B misdemeanors in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3-4(8), which provides that
District Courts generally do not have jurisdiction over such offenses unless an exception
exists when one or more specific conditions precedent are met. At the time that
2

prosecution commenced in the present matter, one of these conditions precedent existed,
namely that no justice court existed within the territorial jurisdiction of Salt Lake City.
See Appellant's opening brief at 7.
The Appellee's does not dispute that at the time the formal information was filed
by the City in this matter, a qualifying condition precedent existed under § 78-3-4(8)
which conferred jurisdiction upon the District Court to adjudicate the class B
misdemeanors charged in the information. Rather, the appellee argues that once the Salt
Lake City Justice Court was established, the condition precedent no longer existed, thus
eliminating the basis for the District Court's jurisdiction over this matter. The appellee
does not identify a legal rationale for concluding that District Court jurisdiction
terminated in this case when the Salt Lake City Justice Court was established other than
the lack of clear statutory language to the contrary. Indeed, the appellee's central
argument seems to be that the absence of specific legislative language to "extending]" 1
jurisdiction to cases such as the present one is evocative of the intent of the Legislature
that such jurisdiction be terminated.
This argument is unpersuasive. First, the appellee's position ignores the legislative
history examined by the City in its opening brief indicating that the Legislature had
previously amended the relevant statutory scheme to remove time limits for the
divestiture of District Court jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors brought pursuant to §
78-3-4(8). See Appellant's opening brief at 12. Given the history of the statutory scheme
involved, the absence of specific statutory language governing the disposition of this and
1

See Appellee's brief at 7. It bears noting that the City's requested relief in this matter is not that District Court
jurisdiction be "extended" to the present matter, but rather that previously-vested District Court jurisdiction
"continue" in this matter.
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similar cases should be read in favor of upholding jurisdiction. Second, the appellee's
suggested reading of the Legislature's intent stands for the relatively radical proposition
that continuing District Court jurisdiction over a properly-filed case can, and in fact
should, be divested simply because necessary conditions precedent that were duly
fulfilled prior to the filing of the matter, cease to exist at some later point in the
proceedings. Such a conclusion would do tremendous violence to the logic of the
statutory scheme invoked by the City in filing this case in the first instance by removing
from continued prosecution a whole category of class B misdemeanors that were properly
filed in District Court prior to July 2002, and which, through no fault of the City, cannot
•y

be subsequently refilled in Justice Court due to applicable Statutes of Limitation.
Finally, as the City explained in its opening brief, ample case law exists which creates a
presumption against the divesture of jurisdiction. Appellant's brief at 4-6. The fact that
the cases cited by the City relate to jurisdictional issues arising in post-conviction or civil
matters should not give this Court pause to distinguish them from the facts of this matter;
rather, the limited breadth and number of cases should give this Court pause to recognize
how truly remarkable the divesture of established jurisdiction is as a practical matter in
our State, as evidenced by the limited legal arenas in which the issue has arisen in the
first place.
Neither the appellee here nor the Court below has suggested a sufficient legal
basis for concluding that District Court jurisdiction over a properly-filed § 78-3-4(8) case
" The appellee argues in his brief that the City's claim that other matters would be affected by the disposition of this
case is neither evidenced by the record nor controlling of this Court's decision. The City previously noted as much
in its opening brief when it indicated that the issue of collaterally-affected cases was "not dispositive" of the issues
at hand. Appellant's brief at 13. However, the City made note of the existence of such cases to illuminate its
continuing practice in cases bought in the District Court pursuant to § 78-3-4(8) prior to July 2002.
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terminated when the Salt Lake City Justice Court was established. This Court should
conclude that the District Court's jurisdiction in this matter vested at the time that the
case was filed and that it should not be stripped absent some clear prerogative to the
contrary.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should reverse the trial court's final order of
dismissal based on the finding that it lacked jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of May, 2009.
SIMARJIT S. GILL
Salt Lake City Prosecutor

Mitchell F. Park
Associate City Prosecutor
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